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ABSTRACT 
 
As an interconnection technology, Bluetooth has to 
address all traditional security problems, well known 
from the distributed networks. Moreover, as Bluetooth 
networks are formed by the radio links, there are also 
additional security aspects whose impact is yet not well 
understood. In this paper, we propose a novel Man-In-
The-Middle (MITM) attack against Bluetooth enabled 
mobile phone that support Simple Secure Pairing( SSP). 
From the literature it was proved that the SSP 
association models such as Numeric comparison, Just 
works and passkey Entry are not more secure. Here we 
propose the Out Of Band (OOB) channeling with 
enhanced security than the previous methods. 
 
Keywords- Authentication, Bluetooth, Man-In-The-
Middle attack, Secure Simple Pairing, Out Of Band 
channeling. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Bluetooth is an open standard for short-range radio 
frequency (RF) communication. Bluetooth standard 
specifies wireless operation in the 2.4 GHz–2.4835 GHz 
ISM frequency band and supports data rates up to 720 
Kbps. Bluetooth uses a frequency-hopping spread-
spectrum (FHSS) technology to solve interference 
problems. The FHSS scheme uses 79 different radio 
channels by changing frequency about 1,600 times per 
second. This allows users to form ad-hoc networks 
between a wide variety of devices to transfer voice and 
data. Bluetooth eliminate wires and cables between both  
 
 
 
 
 
 
stationary and mobile devices. Bluetooth is a low-cost, 
low-power technology that provides a mechanism for 
creating small wireless networks on an ad-hoc basis, 
known as piconets. A piconet is composed of two or more 
Bluetooth devices in close physical proximity that operate 
on the same channel using the same frequency hopping 
sequence. 
 
Because Bluetooth is a wireless communication system, 
there is always a possibility that its transmissions could 
be deliberately jammed or intercepted, or false/altered 
information could be passed to the piconet devices. To 
provide protection for the piconet, the system can 
establish security at several protocol levels. Bluetooth has 
built-in security measures at the link level. 
 
Our work mainly concentrates on the Man-In-The-Middle 
attack. By principle, without  any  verification  of  the  
public  keys,  MITM  attacks  are  generally  possible 
against any message sent by using public-key technology. 
The existing model uses the Bluetooth device that support 
SSP (Printer) that makes use of the Just Works, Numeric 
Comparison and the Pass key entry association models. 
But it was proved that the existing model is not very 
much secure [1]. So we propose to use Out-Of-Band 
channeling association model to have more security.  
 
Out Of Band refers to communications which occur 
outside of a previously established communication 
methods or channel. The cryptographic systems that are 
secure against MITM attacks require an additional 
exchange or transmission of information over some kind 
of secure channel. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides an 
overview of Bluetooth security. Section III gives how 
secure simple pairing works and its authentication stages. 
The existing method and its possibility to MITM attack is 
provided in Section IV. Our work is proposed in Section 
V. Section VI gives the results and discussions we have 
gone with so far and about the results we expect. 
Conclusion is given in section VII. 
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II. BLUETOOTH SECURITY 
 
Principles of security include  
• Authentication- Identity verification 
• Data Confidentiality- protection of 
transmitted data from passive attacks. 
• Authorization-allow the control of resources. 
 
Bluetooth security configuration is done by the user who 
decides how a Bluetooth device will implement its 
connectability and discoverability options. The different 
combinations of connectability and discoverability 
capabilities can be divided into three modes. Each 
Bluetooth device can operate in one mode only at a 
particular time. The three modes are the following: 
 
Security Mode 1—Non-secure mode. , In this mode, the 
security functionality (authentication and encryption) is 
completely bypassed. It just monitors traffic. 
Security Mode 2—Service-level enforced security    
mode, security procedures are initiated after channel 
establishment at the Logical Link Control and Adaptation 
Protocol (L2CAP) level. 
Security Mode 3—Link-level enforced security mode, a 
Bluetooth device initiates security procedures before the 
channel is established. This is a built-in security 
mechanism. This mode supports authentication and 
encryption. These features are based on a secret link key 
that is shared by a pair of devices. To generate this key, a 
pairing procedure is used 
 
Bluetooth related threats include Bluesnarfing, Blue 
jacking, and Blue bugging etc. An example of a long-
distance attacking tool is the Blue Sniper Rifle. It is a rifle 
stock with a powerful directional antenna attached to a 
small Bluetooth compatible computer. At one side the 
security measures for Bluetooth devices increase, but on 
the other side new methods to crack the security measures 
are discovered. 
 
In order for two Bluetooth devices to start communicating, 
procedure called pairing must be performed. As a result 
of pairing, two devices form a trusted pair and establish a 
link key which is used later on for creating a data 
encryption key for each session. Simple Pairing has two 
security goals: protection against passive eavesdropping 
and protection against MITM attacks (active 
eavesdropping). It is also a goal of Simple Pairing to 
exceed the maximum security level provided by the use 
of a 16 character alphanumeric PIN with the pairing 
algorithm. In Bluetooth versions up to 2.0+EDR, pairing 
is based exclusively on the fact that both devices share 
the same PIN (Personal Identification Number) code or 
passkey. When the user enters the same passkey in both 
devices, the devices generate the same shared secret 
which is used for authentication and encryption of traffic 
exchanged by them. Even with longer 16-character 
alphanumeric PINs, full protection against active 
eavesdropping cannot be achieved: it has been shown that 
MITM attacks on Bluetooth communications (versions up 
to 2.0+EDR) can be performed [3], [4]. 
 
Bluetooth version 2.1+EDR adds a new specification for 
the pairing procedure, namely Secure Simple Pairing 
(SSP). Its main goal is to improve the security of pairing 
by providing protection against passive eavesdropping 
and MITM attacks. SSP employs Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman public-key cryptography. To construct the link 
key, devices use public-private key pairs, a number of 
nonces, and Bluetooth addresses of the devices. 2.1+ 
EDR versions have got an additional mode along with the 
given three modes. This security mode 4 is defined for 
Secure Simple Pairing. 
 
SSP works on association models which can be defined 
according to the I/O capabilities of the two devices that 
are connected [5]. 
 
• Numeric Comparison: designed to be used when both 
devices are capable of displaying a six-digit number and 
user input of “yes” or “no”. A typical example could be 
two cell phones pairing with each other. The six-digit 
number displayed in this model is an output of the 
underlying security algorithm. 
• Just Works: designed to be used when at least one of the 
devices does not have display capability of six digits and 
also is not capable of entering six decimal digits using a 
keyboard or any other means. This model does not 
provide protection against MITM attacks. Compared to 
the legacy headsets with a fixed PIN, the security level 
provided by this model is much higher. 
• Out of Band: designed for devices capable of using Out 
of Band (OOB) mechanisms to exchange secretes to be 
used in the pairing process. Near Field Communication 
(NFC) to exchange the cryptographic information by 
touching two devices is an example. 
• Passkey Entry: designed to be used when one of the 
devices does not have display capability of six digits, but 
has the input capability and the other device has output 
capability. PC and keyboard is a typical example of this 
model. The user is shown a six-digit number and then 
asked to enter from the device with only input capability. 
 
III. SECURE SIMPLE PAIRING STAGES 
 
The authentication stages based on SSP have four main 
stages. Prior to the stages first the association model is 
decided according to the I/O capabilities of the two 
devices that getting interacted. The next step here is the 
private key and the public key generation. This step also 
helps in computing the Diffie-Hellman key. The four 
main stages of authentication using SSP are as follows 
[6], [7]. 
 
• Connection establishment: The user on the SAP Client 
end will select one of the device possible SAP Server to 
connect with and perform Bluetooth Service Discovery to 
be absolutely 
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•Authentication Stage 1: This stage varies slightly for 
numeric comparison, OOB and passkey entry. Let us 
assume, that based on the IO Capability of both the 
devices, one side displays a six digit number for the other 
device to enter. After this stage the Authentication Stage 
2 starts. Figure 1 explains this concept with OOB. Table I 
explains about the notations used. 
 
• Authentication Stage 2: At this stage, the results of the 
cryptographic functions are compared and if it is 
successful, the host receives Simple Pair Complete event 
and then the link key computation starts. 
 
     Figure 1. Authentication stage 1 with OOB 
 
  
TABLE I 
PROTOCOL NOTATION 
 
Term   Definition 
 
PKx        Public key of device X 
Nx        Nonce generated by device X 
rx                 Random number generated by device X 
Cx        Commitment value from device X 
f1        One-way function used to compute 
       commitment values 
IO       Input/Output capabilities 
 
 
 
• Link key calculation: At this stage, a Link Key is 
calculated and mutual authentication is performed to 
make sure both the devices have the same link key. 
Similar to the legacy implementation, Link Key 
Notification event is generated on both the initiator and 
responder of the Simple pairing procedure. On the 
initiator end, Authentication Complete event is generated 
at the end of this phase. 
 
• Enable Encryption: The encryption phase is the same as 
the legacy implementation. The link level encryption can 
be enabled using HCI_Set_Connection_Encryption 
command. Once the link is encrypted, the SAP Client will 
start the L2CAP Channel establishment procedure for 
RFCOMM. Finally, SAP connection will be made over 
the RFCOMM Channel. 
 
Even though version 2.1+EDR provides greater security 
measures against the attacks, the devices that are 
commonly used in practice is version 2.0+EDR and it is 
proved that MITM attack is possible in this version.  
  
 
IV. EXISTING METHOD 
 
Consider a Bluetooth enabled device that support SSP for 
example a Bluetooth enabled mobile phone here. The 
association model used here is Just Works. The MITM 
attack in the Bluetooth enabled devices is explained with 
the help of the figure 2 [2], [8]. 
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The attack is explained in two scenarios. In the first 
scenario the victim devices use the Just Works 
association model. Our attack works in the following 
way: 
 
1) The MITM jams the physical layer by hopping along 
with the victim devices and sending random data in every 
timeslot  
2) The MITM impersonates the legitimate device. 
3) MITM intercepts all data. 
4) The MITM relays the data to the legitimate device. 
 
The second scenario is that the devices use the Numeric 
Comparison or the Pass-key Entry model. Both the 
methods give a conclusion that the MITM attack is 
possible. So we propose to use the OOB association 
model and to use Near Field Communication as the OOB 
channel. 
 
The link key derived here is well protected since it is 
derived from a Diffie-Hellman key exchange (carried out 
in an Elliptic curve group, for greater efficiency). 
However, a huge vulnerability is found in the pairing 
mode that is based on passkey entry, numeric comparison, 
or the just works model. 
 
V. PROPOSED METHOD 
  
The security against attacks like MITM attack is to be 
improved. Near Field Communication as the Out Of Band 
channeling is the best suggested method. Just works 
association model is used as an optional one and the Out 
Of Band as the mandatory model.  
 
Such devices that cannot use the new window at the user 
interface level or alternatively NFC as an OOB channel 
(better way), should implement their security either in the 
same way as old Bluetooth devices (versions up to 
2.0+EDR) do or not to use Bluetooth security at all (if no 
sensitive data is exchanged). In this way, the 
implementation of the Just Works association model can 
be made optional and perhaps even removed altogether 
from the Bluetooth SSP specification. The advantage of 
this approach is to eliminate all MITM attacks against the 
Just Works association model. Moreover, if the Just 
Works association model is not supported anymore in the 
future Bluetooth devices, it is not possible to force victim 
devices to use it. 
 
Future Bluetooth specifications should make OOB a 
mandatory association model in order to radically 
improve the security and usability of SSP. However, it is 
likely that such a radical change in the specification will 
not be possible at once. Therefore, future Bluetooth 
specifications should at least strongly recommend the use 
of an OOB channel (e.g., Near Field Communication) to 
all Bluetooth device manufacturers. 
 
 Use of the private security level, increasing user 
awareness of security issues, minimization of transmit 
powers, careful selection of place where sensitive 
information is exchanged are some other efficient 
methods that can be encouraged to improve the security 
of SSP. Among these methods the OOB channeling is the 
one that is proposed in this paper. 
 
To provide more security against MITM attack with the 
OOB channeling various frequencies are considered so 
that the Bluetooth device while communicating uses not 
the same OOB frequency all the time of its 
communication. It uses different frequencies at each time 
of its communication.  
   
 
VI. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
The secure simple pairing process is done using JAVA 
programming. First the pairing is done from PC to PC 
which is shown in the figure 3 that is the encryption and 
decryption.  
 
Our further work is on the improvement to the Secure 
Simple Pairing. Out Of Band association model is to be 
developed and proved it to be an efficient method.  
 
 
Figure 3. PC to PC pairing 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 
It is difficult to create a protocol which caters to all 
possible types of wireless devices, as the security of the 
protocol is likely to be limited by the capabilities of the 
least powerful or the least secure device type. Our 
Bluetooth MITM attack presented in this paper is based 
on this problem. By far the best way to stop the attacks is 
to use an OOB channel, and SSP supports this option. 
Near Field Communication is used as the OOB channel 
and going to prove that this method is more secure. 
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